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Abstract. This paper introduces a new framework for data hiding se-
curity. Contrary to the existing ones, the approach introduced here is
not based on probability theory. In this paper, a scheme is considered
as secure if its behavior is proven unpredictable. The objective of this
study is to enrich the existing notions of data hiding security with a new
rigorous and practicable one. This new definition of security is based on
the notion of topological chaos. It could be used to reinforce the con-
fidence on a scheme previously proven as secure by other approaches
and it could also be used to study some classes of attacks that currently
cannot be studied by the existing security approaches. After presenting
the theoretical framework of the study, a concrete example is detailed in
order to show how our approach can be applied.
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1 Introduction
In past decades, the studies in the information hiding domain have almost ex-
clusively been focused on robustness [1], [8]. Security has emerged in the last
years as a new interest in this domain [9], [24], [26]. Security and robustness are
neighboring concepts without clearly established definitions [25]. Robustness is
often considered to be mostly concerned by blind elementary attacks, whereas se-
curity is not limited to certain specific attacks. Security encompasses robustness
and intentional attacks [13], [20]. The attempts to define the differences between
robustness and security, to clarify the classes of attacks and to give some consis-
tence to the notion of security, illustrates the recent important concern to bring
a rigorous theoretical framework for security in data hiding.
In the framework of watermarking and steganography, security has seen sev-
eral important developments since the last decade. Nevertheless, several open
questions still remain. For example, the current theoretical approach requires
strong hypotheses on the covertext and these hypotheses are quite difficult to
evaluate in practice. Moreover, even if several security classes have been iden-
tified since the first classification of attacks, only a small part of them can be
easily studied within this framework. In the existing approach, when a same
hidden message is embedded into several covertexts, information leak is studied
in terms of probability. If the leak is important, then the scheme is considered
as insecure. In this paper we are interested in the evaluation of unpredictability
of a data hiding scheme: this last is considered as secure if it is proven to be
unpredictable. This new framework can be used to study some classes of attacks
that are difficult to investigate in the existing security approach. It also enriches
the variety of qualitative and quantitative tools that evaluate how strong the
security is, thus reinforcing the confidence that can be put on a given scheme.
Indeed, let us suppose that Eve, an attacker, observes the behavior of a data
hiding machine. If there is no information leak, when Eve applies an input on
the machine, and if nothing can be understanding when the input is changing,
because of the unpredictable behavior of the machine, so she cannot deduce
much things from these observations. This claim is discussed more rigorously in
Section 4.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, related work con-
cerning data hiding security is recalled. Our contribution in relation to existing
framework is explained. In Section 3, the definition of chaos used in this paper
is presented, the notion of chaotic-security is defined and the feasibility of its
study in real-world applications is established. An illustrative example is given
in Section 4: the chaotic-security study of various spread-spectrum data hiding
schemes is presented and the level of security is qualitatively and quantitatively
evaluated. The link between chaotic-security and stego-security is discussed and
the impact of our study in regard to various classes of attacks is detailed. The
paper ends with a conclusion where our contribution is summarized, and planned
future work is discussed.
2 Related work and contribution
2.1 Related work
The first fundamental work in security was made by Cachin in the late 90’s [9]
in the context of steganography. Cachin interprets the attempt of an attacker
to distinguish between an innocent image and a stego-content as a hypothesis
testing problem. In this document, the basic properties of a stegosystem are
defined using the notions of entropy, mutual information, and relative entropy.
Mittelholzer [24], inspired by the work of Cachin, proposed the first theoretical
framework for analyzing the security of a watermarking scheme.
These efforts to bring a theoretical framework for security in steganography
and watermarking, have been followed up by Kalker [20] who tries to clarify
the concepts (robustness vs. security) and the classifications of watermarking
attacks. This work has been deepened by Furon et al. [16], who have trans-
lated Kerckhoffs’ principle (Alice and Bob shall only rely on some previously
shared secret for privacy) from cryptography to data hiding. They used Diffie
and Hellman methodology, and Shannon’s cryptographic framework [29].
These attacks have been classified into categories, according to the type of
information Eve has access to [12], [27]:
– Watermarked Only Attack (WOA): the attacker has access only to water-
marked contents.
– Known Message Attack (KMA): the attacker has access to pairs of water-
marked contents and corresponding hidden messages.
– Known Original Attack (KOA): occurs when an attacker has access to several
pairs of watermarked contents and their corresponding original versions.
– Constant-Message Attack (CMA): the attacker observes several watermarked
contents and only knows that the unknown hidden message is the same in
all contents.
Each category of attack conducts to different security classes. For example,
four classes of security are defined in [11] for WOA, namely insecurity, key-
security, subspace-security and stego-security.
Barni et al. proposed a different approach to watermarking security, based
on games with some rules concerning the public available information [6], con-
ducting to a definition of security level similar to that proposed by Furon. Lastly,
Cayre et al. proposed in [12] the Fisher Information Matrix to quantify security
in this context.
2.2 Some reasons why unpredictability can improve security
Stego-security is clearly relevant and required in WOA setup: Eve has only ac-
cess to watermarked contents and due to stego-security, it is impossible for her
to decide whether a content has been processed through the embedding func-
tion or not. So in WOA setup, a stego-secure algorithm can face Eve’s attacks.
However, such a framework is not as useful to counteract KOA, KMA and CMA
classes of attacks. In these setups, Eve tries to take benefits of its observations
of watermarked contents, when she changes some initial conditions in the data
hiding scheme. She desires having a sufficient understanding of the scheme and
to be able to predict its behavior.
This knowledge can serve an attacker in various situations, for example when
trying to counteract digital rights management (DRM), or in a man-in-the-
middle attack through an hidden channel. Let us explain for example how Eve
can try to achieve a man-in-the-middle attack by taking benefits of the pre-
dictable behavior of a scheme in KOA setup. We suppose that Alice and Bob
communicate together through an hidden channel into some innocent master
paintings. Eve has thus access to original and watermarked paintings, by using
a base of knowledge and observing the communication channel. If she is able to
predict the behavior of the data hiding scheme used by Alice and Bob, so when
Alice send a watermarked painting Po to Bob: Eve intercepts Po, use the same
painting P than Alice, and tries to predict how its own message should change
P . The result of this prediction is sent to Bob. It is true that the chances for
success for this attack are low, but these chances increase with the predictability
of the data hiding scheme, thus revealing a security failure.
Let us now suppose that Eve wants to attack some DRM. She has access to
several pairs of watermarks - the copyrights, which are public - and watermarked
media: we are in KMA setup. In addition, she has access to the data hiding
machine, but does not have knowledge of a secret key parameter, from which
the outputs of the scheme are dependent. This key thus determines the way to
apply the copyright into the media. She wants to insert its own copyright in this
protected media, to make it impossible to determine whether Eve is the owner
or not. She does not know exactly how copyrights are applied on original media,
because the DRM machine works with a secret key. However Eve can reach its
goal if she is able to predict the behavior of the copyright machine: she can
approximately determine what should be the watermarked media with its own
copyright. As a conclusion, in various situations, unpredictable schemes should
be recommended to improve security in data hiding.
2.3 Contributions in this paper
In this paper, a novel theoretical framework for data hiding security is proposed.
A data hiding scheme is considered here as a machine, whose detail is public. This
machine receives hidden messages and original contents from the outside world
and returns stego-contents. In our point of view, security of the scheme depends
on the unpredictable behavior of the machine. To give consistence to the notion of
unpredictability, this machine is modeled as a dynamical system: xn+1 = f(xn)
(where xn denotes the nth term of the sequence x). This reformulation is always
possible, as it is proven in Section 3.2.
Thus, unpredictability refers to some topological or ergodic aspects of f
taken from the mathematical theory of chaos, as defined by Devaney [15], Li-
Yorke [22], or Adler [2] for example. This new theoretical framework for security
respects Kerckhoffs’principle. It is based on a topological description of data
hiding, whereas most studies in this field usually have used the theory of proba-
bility [25], [17]. The goal of this research work is to give additional contribution
to the variety of security evaluations which should lead to better confidence into
data hiding schemes.
Compared to the information-theoretic model for steganography proposed
by Cachin [9] and extended for example by Ker [21], chaotic-security appears
to be a little more relevant and probably more realizable than stego-security
in some particular situations, for example when chaotic sequences are used in
data hiding schemes. This framework can check whether the claim of a chaotic
behavior for a data hiding scheme can be verified or not. Indeed, to our best
knowledge, stego-security studies often take place in WOA category and are re-
lated to Simmons’ prisoners’ problem [30]. In this problem, Alice and Bob are
in jail and want to plan an escape by exchanging hidden messages in innocent-
looking cover contents. These messages are conveyed by Eve, a warden who tries
to benefit from any information leak resulting by the use of the same secret key.
Quoting Cayre and Bas in [11]: “Like other works, we consider Alice and Bob
use only one key. Of course, in real applications, especially in steganography, it
is highly desirable to change the key at every communication between Alice and
Bob.” In addition, a probabilistic model of the covertext is needed and, as stated
by Cachin in [9], “assuming the existence of a covertext distribution seems to
render our model somewhat unrealistic for the practical purpose of steganogra-
phy”. The new framework we propose does not suppose any assumption of this
kind, works with simple or multiple secret keys and is not restricted to some
category of attacks. Our approach is explained in detail in the following section.
3 Chaos for data hiding security
We will consider that a data hiding scheme is secure when its behavior is unpre-
dictable. The mathematical domain that studies unpredictability is the theory
of chaos, which describes the behavior of a dynamical system in topological
terms. One of the most reputed description of such a chaotic behavior is due
to Devaney [15]. It is recalled in the next subsection, whereas the notion of
chaotic-security deduced from this definition is presented in Subsection 3.2.
3.1 Devaney’s chaotic dynamical systems
Consider a metric space (X , d) and a continuous function f on X . Let fk =
f ◦ ... ◦ f denotes the kth composition of a function f . Quoting Devaney in [15],
Definition 1. f is said to be topologically transitive if, for any pair of open
sets U, V ⊂ X , there exists k > 0 such that fk(U) ∩ V 6= ∅.
Definition 2. An element (a point) x is a periodic element (point) for f of
period n ∈ N∗, if fn(x) = x. The set of periodic points of f is denoted Per(f).
Definition 3. {X , f} is said to be regular if the set of periodic points is dense
in X ,
∀x ∈ X , ∀ε > 0, ∃p ∈ Per(f), d(x, p) 6 ε.
Definition 4. f has sensitive dependence on initial conditions if there exists
δ > 0 such that, for any x ∈ X and any neighborhood V of x, there exists y ∈ V
and n > 0 such that |fn(x) − fn(y)| > δ.
δ is called the constant of sensitivity of f .
Definition 5. A function f : X −→ X is said to be chaotic on X if {X , f}
is regular, topologically transitive and has sensitive dependence on initial condi-
tions.
When f is chaotic, then the system {X , f} is chaotic and quoting Devaney [15]:
“it is unpredictable because of the sensitive dependence on initial conditions. It
cannot be bren down or simplified into two subsystems which do not interact
because of topological transitivity. And in the midst of this random behavior, we
nevertheless have an element of regularity”. Fundamentally different behaviors
are consequently possible and occurs in an unpredictable way.
3.2 Chaotic-security
As stated before, we believe that an unpredictable behavior is required for a
data hiding scheme to satisfy an efficient level of security. This unpredictability
makes it difficult to determine whose coefficients of the cover media will be al-
tered during the embedding of the watermark, which limits the possibilities of
Eve in KOA and KMA attacks. The scheme should at least be chaotic according
to Devaney: this property will improve the ability of Alice and Bob to withstand
attacks. Indeed, it will be as difficult for Eve to find the hidden message after n
iterations than to forecast the weather after n days without mistakes: because
of chaos, this last becomes impossible to do in practice when n increases. Due
to Devaney’s chaos, such a “chaotic-secure” information hiding scheme will thus
satisfy sensitive dependence to the initial condition, regularity and transitivity.
Sensitivity to initial conditions is useful, among other, to withstand sensitivity
attack [14] (it can be noticed that, in the context of the sensitivity attack, various
strategies have been already employed [18]). In addition, sensitivity is helpful to
achieve authentication, because the watermark’s embedding will be highly de-
pendent on any changes of the carrier image. Moreover, fragile data hiding is
achieved with a large constant of sensitivity. Transitivity trends to improves ro-
bustness: for example, Eve cannot hope to remove the watermark by cropping
the media. Indeed, the system will visit all the space, so the watermark will be
uniformly distributed on the whole media. This property improves authentica-
tion, as this last can be achieved by studying any part of the media: theoretically
speaking, authentication still remains possible in a cropped media. Transitivity
trends to improve security too, as Eve cannot have a better understanding of
the scheme, cannot reduce its complexity by studying only a well chosen reduced
part of the watermarked content. Lastly, transitivity and regularity lead to un-
predictability, which helps Alice and Bob to withstands KOA and KMA attacks.
For these reasons we believe that this new point of view could enrich the field
of security in data hiding.
Let us now present more rigorously the new notion of chaotic-security. To
check whether an existing data hiding scheme is chaotic or not, we propose
firstly to write it as an iterate process xn+1 = f(xn). It is possible to prove
that this formulation can always be done. Let us consider a given data hiding
algorithm. It is always possible to translate it as a Turing machine and this last
can be written as xn+1 = f(xn) by the following way. Let (w, i, q) be the current
configuration of the Turing machine (Fig. 1), where w = ♯−ωw(0) . . . w(k)♯ω is
the paper tape, i is the position of the tape head, q is used for the state of the
machine, and δ is its transition function. We define f by:
– f(w(0) . . . w(k), i, q) = (w(0) . . . w(i − 1)aw(i + 1)w(k), i + 1, q′),
if δ(q, w(i)) = (q′, a,→),
– f(w(0) . . . w(k), i, q) = (w(0) . . . w(i − 1)aw(i + 1)w(k), i − 1, q′),
if δ(q, w(i)) = (q′, a,←).
Thus the Turing machine can be written as an iterate function xn+1 = f(xn)
on a well-defined set X , with x0 as the initial configuration of the machine. We
denote by T (S) the iterative process of a data hiding scheme S.
# w(i) #
k0
q
Fig. 1. Turing Machine
Let d be a relevant distance on X . So the behavior of this dynamical system
can be studied to know whether the data hiding scheme is unpredictable or not.
This leads to the following definition.
Definition 6. An information hiding scheme S is said to be chaotic-secure on
(X , d) if its iterative process T (S) has a chaotic behavior according to Devaney.
Theoretically speaking, chaotic security can always be studied, as it only
requires that the two following points are satisfied.
– Firstly, the data hiding scheme must be written as an iterate function on a
set X . We have stated that this is possible for any given scheme.
– Secondly, a metric or a topology must be defined on X . This is always pos-
sible, for example by taking either the discrete or the trivial topology, even
though these last are not really relevant for the aims we want to reach.
Chaotic-security is clearly impacted by the choice of the distance or topology
on X and this dependence must be regarded with attention. It is evident that
the choice of the metric (or of the topology) must be justified, for example by
establishing a strong link between the proximity of two points and the aims
that data hiding attempts to reach. However, some topologies are more natural
and reasonable than others, and equivalence of topologies reduces the impact
of this choice. In addition, it can be remarked that stego-security supposes the
same kind of hypothesis: dealing with probabilities implies the definition of a
sigma-algebra. To our best knowledge, the Borel algebra is always chosen, even
though this choice is neither stated, nor justified. As a topological space is needed
to define Borel sets, we can claim that at least when a stego-security study is
possible, so a chaotic study can be realized, with a topology inherited from the
stego-security study (which justifies its choice).
In our point of view, the chaotic-security is the lowest level of security for a
data hiding scheme in terms of unpredictability. This property is required, but
is not sufficient: it is only the first stage of the evaluation of the unpredictable
behavior of the scheme. This study must be followed by the establishment of the
list of chaotic properties that the system presents. Indeed, being unpredictable
is a tricky thing to define and the number of candidates that give consistence to
this notion is large. Namely topological and metric entropy, ergodicity, topolog-
ical mixing, lyapunov exponent, expansivity, transitivity and strong transitivity,
bifurcation theory, or chaos as defined by Li-Yorke, by Devaney or by Knudsen to
name a few. As each definition illustrates a particular aspect of an unpredictable
behavior and has its own interest, each notion of chaos offers a new light on the
security of a data hiding scheme. Thus we consider that a given data hiding
scheme will be more secure than another one if it presents a larger number of
chaotic qualities and if its quantitative values are better. Indeed the properties
to check is depending on the aims to reach: fragile watermarking, robustness,
etc. This point is illustrated in the next section and will be largely deepened in
a future work.
4 Chaotic-security of spread-spectrum data hiding
schemes
4.1 A first proof of chaotic-security
In what follows, our framework is used to give a first chaotic-security evaluation
of the well-known spread-spectrum (SS) data hiding techniques [11]. This proves
that the previous framework is ready for real-world applications and establishes
a concrete link between chaotic and stego-security notions.
Let x ∈ RNv be an host vector in which we want to hide a message m ∈
{0; 1}Nc. Nc is the size of the hidden payload (in bits) and Nv the size of the
stego or host vector (in samples). A key K is used to initialize a PRNG (Pseudo-
Random Number Generator) to obtain Nc secret carries {u
i} taken in RNv . Thus
in classical SS the watermark signal w is constructed as follows:
w =
Nc−1∑
i=0
γ(−1)m
i
ui (1)
where γ is a given distortion level. The watermarked signal y is then defined by:
y = x+ w (2)
Let us now suppose that the components of the watermark are bounded by a
finite value N: max({wi, i ∈ J1, NvK}) 6 N. This bound can be as large as needed,
however a very large N seems to be contradictory with the aims of a data hiding
scheme. Let us consider X =
(
[0,N]
Nv
)N
×RNv and
G((S,E)) = (σ(S); i(S) + E) (3)
where σ is the shift function defined by σ : (Sn)n∈N ∈
(
[0,N]
Nv
)N
→ (Sn+1)n∈N ∈(
[0,N]
Nv
)N
and the initial function i is the map which associates to a sequence,
its first term: i : (Sn)n∈N ∈
(
[0,N]
Nv
)N
→ S0 ∈ [0;N]Nv .
Spread-spectrum data hiding techniques are thus the result of Nc iterations
of the following dynamical system:{
X0 ∈ X ,
Xn+1 = G(Xn),
(4)
and the watermarked media is the second component of XNc .
Classical SS, i.e. with BPSK modulation [11], is defined by X0 = (S0, E0)
where E0 is the host vector x and S0 is the sequence(
(−1)m
0
γ u0, (−1)m
1
γ u1, . . . , (−1)m
Nc−1
γ uNc−1
)
, (5)
in which γ allows to achieve a given distortion, whereas in ISS (Improved Spread
Spectrum [23]), S0 is defined by
(
(−1)m
i
α−
< x, ui >
||ui||2
)
i=0,...,Nc−1
, (6)
where α and λ are computed to achieve an average distortion and to minimize
the error probability [11]. Lastly, in natural watermarking NW, S0 is defined by
(
−
(
1 + η(−1)m
i < x, ui >
| < x, ui > |
)
< x, ui >
||ui||2
)
i=0,...,Nc−1
. (7)
This modulation consists in a model-based projection on the different vectors
ui followed by a η−scaling along the direction of ui. Natural watermarking has
been proven stego-secure in [11].
We will prove in what follows that spread-spectrum data hiding schemes are
chaotic-secure, i.e. that G is chaotic on (X , d), thus finding a first chaotic and
stego-secure algorithm.
Let d∞(A,B) = max {|Ai −Bi|, i = 1 . . .Nv} be one of the usual metrics on
R
Nv . We define a new distance between two points X = (S,E), Y = (Sˇ, Eˇ) ∈ X
by d(X,Y ) = d∞(E, Eˇ) + ds(S, Sˇ), where ds(S, Sˇ) =
9
N
∞∑
k=0
d∞(S
k, Sˇk)
10k
.
The choice of d∞ on R
Nv is not important, because of the equivalence of
norms in finite dimension: as topologies are the same, thus chaotic properties
does not change by using another distance on RNv . ds has been chosen such that
d(X,Y ) is small when the distance between the watermarked images resulting
on the spread-spectrum applied on X and Y are close (for any metrics on RNv ,
as they are all equivalent). Lastly,
9
N
is just a normalization value.
We will now prove that:
Proposition 1. G is continuous on (X , d).
Proof. We use the sequential continuity. Let (Sn, En)n∈N be a sequence of the
phase space X , which converges to (S,E). We will prove that (G(Sn, En))n∈N
converges to G(S,E). Let us recall that for all n, Sn is a strategy, thus, we
consider a sequence of strategies (i.e. a sequence of sequences).
As d((Sn, En); (S,E)) converges to 0, each distance d∞(En, E) and ds(Sn, S)
converges to 0.
1. If
9
N
∞∑
k=0
d∞(S
k
n, S
k)
10k
→ 0 when n → ∞, then
9
N
∞∑
k=1
d∞(S
k
n, S
k)
10k
→ 0. So
9
N
∞∑
k=0
d∞(S
k+1
n , S
k+1)
10k+1
=
1
10
ds(σ(Sn);σ(S)) → 0. As a consequence,
ds(σ(Sn), σ(S)) converges to 0.
2. Let us prove that d∞ (i(Sn) + En; i(S) + E) → 0.
d∞ (i(Sn) + En; i(S) + E) = max {|(i(Sn)k + (En)k)− (i(S)k + Ek)| , k = 1 . . .Nv}
= max {|(i(Sn)k − i(S)k) + ((En)k − Ek)| , k = 1 . . .Nv}
6 max {|i(Sn)k − i(S)k| , k = 1 . . .Nv} + d∞(En, E)
= d∞(S
0
n, S
0) + d∞(En, E)
6 ds(Sn, S) + d∞(En, E)
= d ((Sn, En); (S,E)) → 0.
Proposition 2. Periodic points of G are dense in X , so G is regular.
Proof. Let (S,E) ∈ X and ε > 0. We are looking for a periodic point (Sˇ, Eˇ) ∈ X
such that d
(
(S,E), (Sˇ, Eˇ)
)
< ε. Let Eˇ = E and Sn denotes the sequence defined
by: 

Skn = S
k ∀k 6 n
Skn = (N, . . . ,N) if k > n and k ≡ 0 (mod 2)
Skn = (−N, . . . ,−N) else.
Then ds(Sn, S) =
9
N
∞∑
k=n+1
d∞(S
k
n, S
k)
10k
6
9
N
∞∑
k=n+1
N
10k
=
1
10n
→ 0 when
n → ∞. So ∃n0 ∈ N such that ds(S
n0 , S) < ε. The point (Sn0 , E) is then a
periodic point of X which is ε-close to the given point (S,E).
We will now prove that,
Proposition 3. G is transitive on X .
Proof. Let BA = B (XA, rA) and BB = B (XB, rB) be two open balls of X , where
XA = (SA, EA) and XB = (SB , EB). We are looking for X˜ = (S˜, E˜) ∈ BA such
that ∃n0 ∈ N, G
n0(X˜) ∈ BB.
Let k0 ∈ Z such that 10
−k0 6 rA < 10
−k0+1 and
(
Sˇ, Eˇ
)
= Gk0 (XA). We
define X˜ = (S˜, E˜) as below:
– E˜ = EA,
– ∀k 6 k0, S˜
k = SkA,
– ∀k ∈ J1, NvK, S˜
k0+k = (−Eˇk + EkB) × (0, . . . , 0, 1, 0, . . . , 0), i.e. the vector
S˜k0+k has its components null, except its kth, equals to (−Eˇk + EkB),
– ∀k ∈ N, S˜k0+Nv+k+1 = SkB.
With such a definition, X˜ is in BA and satisfies G
k0+Nv
(
X˜
)
∈ BB.
As G is regular and transitive on (X , d), we can conclude that G is sensitive
to initial conditions (using the result of Banks [5]), thus proving that G is chaotic
in the meaning of Devaney. As a conclusion,
Theorem 1. Spread-spectrum data hiding techniques are chaotic-secure.
All the variety of SS techniques are concerned by this property of chaotic-
security. In the point of view presented above, the choice of NW instead of ISS
only affects the initial condition of the iterations of G. Indeed, the theory of
chaos gives a global approach of the unpredictable behavior of a given system,
but does not explain how to choose a good initial condition. For example, the
reputed logistic map X0 ∈ [0, 1], Xn+1 = 4Xn(1−Xn), has a chaotic behavior,
but if we choose X0 = 0, then ∀n ∈ N, Xn = 0... We believe that stego-security
is helpful to determine the initial values: to increase the security level of a given
scheme, we thus recommend to use a chaotic-secure algorithm with stego-secure
initial conditions. This discussion will be deepened in details in a future work.
4.2 Qualitative and quantitative evaluation
As stated before, the proof that a given data hiding scheme is chaotic-secure,
is just the beginning of the study. The next stage is to evaluate the quality of
its chaotic behavior, by using the numerous qualitative and quantitative tools
offered by the theory of chaos. These tools allow to compare two given chaotic-
secure schemes, by deciding which scheme is the most unpredictable and thus
must be preferred. To give illustration, some tools are recalled in this section,
namely strong transitivity, and the constants of expansivity and sensitivity. We
will use them to give a better understanding of the unpredictability of spread-
spectrum techniques.
Qualitative property: Strong transitivity
Definition 7. A discrete dynamical system {X , f} is said to be strongly transi-
tive if and only if, for any point A,B ∈ X and any neighborhood V of B, n0 ∈ N
and X ∈ V can be found such that fn(X) = A.
We have the result,
Proposition 4. {X , G} is strongly transitive.
Proof. Let us reconsider the proof of the transitivity of (X , G): we have de-
fined X˜ ∈ BA such that G
k0+Nv
(
X˜
)
∈ BB. Indeed, for this X˜, we have:
Gk0+Nv
(
X˜
)
= XB.
Quantitative measures One of the most famous measure in the theory of
chaos is the constant of sensitivity defined in Definition 4. Intuitively, a function
f having a constant sensitivity equal to δ implies that there exists points arbi-
trarily close to any point x which eventually separate from x by at least δ under
some iterations of f . This induces that an arbitrarily small error on an initial
condition may magnified upon iterations of f . The sensitive dependence on the
initial conditions is a consequence of regularity and transitivity [5]. However, the
constant of sensitivity can be obtained by proving the sensitivity without Banks’
theorem.
Proposition 5. Spread-spectrum data hiding techniques {X , G} have sensitive
dependence on initial conditions and its constant of sensitivity is equal to
N
2
.
Proof. Let X = (S,E) ∈ X , B = B (X, r) an open ball centered in X , and
k0 ∈ Z such that 10
−k0 6 r < 10−k0+1. We define Xˇ by:
– Eˇ = E,
– Sˇk = Sk, ∀k ∈ N such that k 6= k0 + 1,
– if Sk0+11 <
N
2
, then Sˇk0+11 = N, else Sˇ
k0+1
1 = 0,
– ∀i ∈ J2, NvK, Sˇ
k0+1
i = S
k0+1
i .
So d(X, Xˇ) = D∞(E, Eˇ)+dS(S, Sˇ) = 0+
9
N
d∞(S
k0+1, Sˇk0+1)
10k0+1
6
9
N
N
10k0+1
6
1
10k0
6 r, then Xˇ ∈ B. Let us now define E : X → X , (S,E) 7→ E. So
E
(
Gk0+1(X)
)
0
= E
(
Gk0+1(Xˇ)
)
0
, because E = Eˇ and Sk = Sˇk, ∀k 6 k0+1. As:
– E
(
Gk0+2(X)
)
0
= E
(
Gk0+1(X)
)
0
+ Sk0+10 ,
– E
(
Gk0+2(Xˇ)
)
0
= E
(
Gk0+1(Xˇ)
)
0
+ Sˇk0+10 ,
–
∣∣∣Sk0+10 − Sˇk0+10
∣∣∣ > N
2
.
We thus have d
(
Gk0+2(X), Gk0+2(Xˇ)
)
> d∞
(
E
(
Gk0+2(X)
)
, E
(
Gk0+2(Xˇ)
))
>
∣∣E (Gk0+2(X))
0
− E
(
Gk0+2(Xˇ)
)
0
∣∣ > N
2
.
Let us now recalled another usual quantitative measure of disorder.
Definition 8. A function f is said to have the property of expansivity if
∃ε > 0, ∀x 6= y, ∃n ∈ N, d(fn(x), fn(y)) > ε.
Then ε is the constant of expansivity of f : an arbitrarily small error on any
initial condition is always amplified till ε.
Proposition 6. {X , G} is not an expansive chaotic system.
Proof. Let ε > 0. We define: X = (ONv ; (ONv , ONv , . . . , ONv , . . .)) and Y =(
ONv ; (
ε
2
INv ,−
ε
2
INv , . . . ,
(−1)nε
2
INv , . . .)
)
, where ONv = (0, . . . , 0) is the null
vector of size Nv and INv is the vector of size Nv equal to (1, 0, . . . , 0). Thus, for
this two points, we have: ∀n ∈ N, d (Gn(X);Gn(Y )) 6 ε.
4.3 Discussion
Let us give now some consequences of this qualitative and quantitative evalu-
ation. First of all, we can regret that spread-spectrum is not expansive. This
property reduces drastically the benefits that Eve can obtain of an attack in
KMA or KOA setup. For example, it is impossible to have an estimation of
the watermark by moving the message (or the cover) as a cursor in situation
of expansivity: this cursor will be too much sensible and the changes will be
too much important to be useful. On the contrary, a very large constant of
expansivity ε is unsuitable: the cover media will be strongly altered whereas
the watermark should be undetectable. Indeed, let us consider the same cover
twice with two different watermarks. Thus d(X,Y ) < 1 for the distance de-
fined previously. However, due to expansivity, ∃n ∈ N, d (Gn(X);Gn(Y )) > ε.
Thus, d∞ (G
n(X)1;G
n(Y )1) > ε − 1, so either d∞ (X1;G
n(X)1) >
ε− 1
2
, or
d∞ (Y1;G
n(Y )1) >
ε− 1
2
. If ε is large, then at least one of the two watermarked
media will be very different than its original cover. Due to strong transitivity,
the set of watermarked media obtained when using a fixed watermark, is equal
to the whole set of media. In that situation, Eve cannot reduce the set of media
to studied, reducing so the interest of a Constant-Message Attack setup for Eve.
The importance of the sensitivity has been explained previously.
We will now discuss various consequences of the introduction of this new
framework for security. Firstly, new comparisons can be done between given
data hiding schemes, as it is illustrated by the following example. In a previ-
ous work [4], we have proven that a famous tool in discrete dynamical systems,
namely chaotic iterations, satisfies the Devaney’s definition of chaos and we have
proposed various applications of this tool in information security [31], [19], [4].
These chaotic iterations can be used to realize a data hiding scheme, as it is
explained in [3]. Qualitative and quantitative chaotic tools introduced in Sec-
tion 4 can thus be used to compare this algorithm to the spread-spectrum data
hiding schemes. It can be proven that data hiding schemes based on chaotic iter-
ations are chaotic secure, with the additional property of strong transitivity, as
it is the case of spread-spectrum. However, chaotic iteration data hiding schemes
have a larger constant of sensitivity than spread-spectrum and contrary to this
last, chaotic iterations are expansive (with a constant of expansivity equal to
1). Moreover, chaotic iterations are topologically mixing, proving so that chaotic
iterations appear to be more suitable than spread-spectrum to withstand attacks
in KOA, KMA and CMA setup. All these claims will be proven in a future work.
5 Conclusion and future work
In this paper, a new concept of security for data hiding schemes is proposed
as a complementary approach to the existing framework. This new notion of
security contributes to the reinforcement of confidence into existing secure data
hiding schemes. Moreover, it can replace stego-security in situations that are
not encompassed by it. In particular, this framework is more relevant to give
evaluation of data hiding schemes based on chaotic maps.
In our approach, a data hiding scheme is secure if it is unpredictable. Its
iterative process must satisfy the Devaney’s chaos property and its level of se-
curity increases with the number of chaotic properties satisfied by it. This point
has been clarified in Section 4, in which a first study of chaotic-security is pro-
posed using some qualitative and quantitative tools taken from the mathematical
theory of chaos.
We have shown in this paper that the intersection between the two sets
of stego-secure and chaotic-secure data hiding algorithms is nonempty, due to
spread-spectrum techniques. This establishes a first connection between the two
approaches for security in data hiding. In future work, we will discuss with more
attention this fact, to give a better understanding of the links between these two
frameworks. The comparison between spread-spectrum and chaotic iterations
outlined in Section 4.3 will be deepened. In addition, new tools taken from the
theory of chaos will be introduced to enrich chaotic-security. Moreover, these
tools will be compared to the Fisher Information Matrix and other information
theoretic measures. The security of other existing schemes will be studied in the
framework of chaos, to compare them to spread-spectrum and chaotic iterations.
We will thus wonder whether chaotic iterations are stego-secure, or not. Last,
but not least, the way to understand these chaotic tools in terms of data hiding
aims will be deepened: this study is required to make chaotic-security framework
really useful in practice.
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